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Summary 
Due to the "global terrorism project", some States have adopted offensive counterterrorism 
measures which, though within national strategies on security and defense, contemplate the 
use of military power and the use of lethal force against non-state actors - individuals, 
groups or terrorist organizations - beyond their national borders.  
Reformulating the security paradigm has led, in these cases, to policies against terrorism. 
This is the case of targeted killing - the killing of selected targets - by the USA and Israel.  
Targeted killing actions - using essentially but not only drones - in Pakistan and Yemen by 
the American administration, a well as the Israeli response to Palestinian terrorism, are 
under heated debate in terms of their efficiency and legality. Thus, this paper aims to not 
only provide an analytical framework on this theme but also analyze the scope and impact 
of these counter terrorist strategies by the two countries 
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OFFENSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM  
TARGETED KILLING IN ELIMINATING TERRORIST TARGETS:  
THE CASE OF THE USA AND ISRAEL 
 
 
Hermínio Matos 
 
 
"The State of Israel has had very, very little faith in Biblical prophecies.  
This is why it still exists, when some - wrapped in their religious myths -  
want to erase it from the world map." 
PEREIRA, JOSÉ TELES, 2008 
 
“Targeted Killing It is the ultimate prevention (…) a policy of  
taking them out to lunch before they have you for dinner.” 
O'CONNOR, T., 2011 
 
“If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence… 
 If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel.”  
GOLDA MEIR 
 
 
The Problem 
The context of a terrorist action evidences the symbiotic relation whose ideological, and 
therefore crucial, roots are one or more issues of identity - ethnical, religious or cultural 
- ultimately converging to one common end: changing, keeping or exercising Power1
It is under the proclaimed global Islamic Jihadist movement that lies the ambitious 
political and religious project aiming to create a “pan-Islamic theocracy and the 
restoration of the caliphate” (Bakker, 2008: 69), reinforcing the claims announced long 
ago, the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 2007), the Huntingtonian paradigm of 
“civilizational clash” (Huntington, 2001). 
. 
Due to the "global terror venture", some States, within varied counterterrorist 
strategies, have adopted offensive responses which, though part of national security 
strategies, in some cases contemplate the use of military force, either autonomously or 
in coordination, and the use of lethal force against non-state actors - individuals, 
terrorist groups or organizations - beyond their territorial borders.  
Though the best known examples are those of the United States and Israel, which we 
will analyze in detail, some European states could also be included, either in terms of 
                                                        
1  A concept which is very clear here, despite its conceptual ambiguity. To Joseph Nye, for example, "power 
is a controversial concept. There is not a widely accepted definition and the opting for a one reflects your 
own interests and values. Some define power as the ability to create or resist change" (Nye, 2012: p. 24). 
Similarly, "it can be defined as the set of means able to coerce others to behave a certain way. (...) there 
is a series of means able to impose a behaviour, therefore, there is a wide range of powers defined by 
their means which provide them with their basis" (Lara, 2011: 256). 
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their individual action or within the framework of international security and defense 
organizations they are members of, NATO being the major example.  
This type of actions is, however, not a recent phenomenon. Military action against non 
states was intimately linked to colonial hegemony of some European powers, especially 
in the second half of the 20th century, as an offensive response to subversive 
movements of rebellion and liberation. These essentially military actions were either 
large scale military operations or focused on the mere elimination of the leaders of 
insurgent groups2
 The insurgents, on the other hand, mainly used guerrilla and counter-guerrilla 
strategies as "terror action"
.   
3
Religious-inspired terrorism, in particular from Islam, started at the end of the 1970s 
as a result of three events which occurred in 1979: the Iranian Revolution, the 
beginning of the new Islamic century and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
army (Rapoport, 2004: 61). The so-called "fourth wave of terrorism", whose distinctive 
feature was made evident in the 9/11 attacks, provided "al-Qaeda & Associated 
Movements" (AQAM
, viewed by other liberation groups as effective 
"insurrectional doctrine" (Rapoport, 1971: 55) against the colonizing power. 
4), then as well as now, the top spot in the list of threats to 
international security5
According to Jenkins (2012: 1-3)
. 
6
Al-Qaeda, besides the scope of its terrorist action – from the perspective of “hard 
power”
, this "Jihadist Galaxy - itself a "moving target" - 
allows al-Qaeda and its associated movements the status of arch-enemy of the West, 
dividing academics and specialists, today more than ever, as far as their strategic and 
operational potential  and as their threat level are  concerned.  
7 – has been able to project,  more successfully than the West, what Joseph Nye 
(2004; 2009; 2012) defined as “soft power”8
                                                        
2  As examples, we could mention CIA activities in Chile, Cuba, Guatemala and Panama at the referred time. 
, i.e., “the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion”. In some cases even, using both powers and 
results - in different areas such as recruitment, violent radicalization or terrorist 
training - the organization has been able to be globally implemented and have an 
3  The expression is in inverted commas as the insurgents or "liberation movements" were also seen as 
"freedom fighters". 
4  In Portuguese, al-Qaeda e movimentos associados. 
5  For extensive description of "terrorist waves", proposed by Rapoport, See  Rapoport, David C. (1971) 
Terrorism & Assassination. Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation; [ed.] (2001) Inside Terrorist 
Organizations. London: Frank Cass and (2005) Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, 4 vols. 
London: Routledge. 
6  Therefore, the analyses of the organization are both non-consensual and eventually plural: “al Qaeda is 
many things at once and must therefore be viewed in all of its various dimensions. It is a global terrorist 
enterprise, the center of a universe of like-minded fanatics, an ideology of violent jihad, an autonomous 
online network. It is a virtual army. Increasingly, it is a conveyer of individual discontents”.   
7  Or “Hard Power”. For Nye, hard power is linked with the use of force and coercion. Basically, the 
difference lies in that "Hard power is pushing; soft power is pulling." (Nye, 2012: p. 39). On this issue, 
see Gray, Colin S. (2011) “Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of 
Policy in the 21St Century”. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. 
8 Soft power, in short, may be seen as "the ability to affect others through framework cooptation of 
objectives, persuasion and positive attraction so as to obtain the desired results. (…) The type of 
resources associated with soft power frequently include intangible factors ” (Nye, 2012: 39-40). 
Noteworthy is that "soft power" is the term used in the books this author published in 2009 and 2012, 
translated into Portuguese in two different ways "poder suave" and "poder brando", both deriving from 
the concept of "Soft Power".  
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ideological influence (through "Intelligent Power"9), allowing it to become what some 
describe as supra-state power10
The well-established American imperialistic perspective contrasts with the idea that the 
intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 proved the old 
maxim that the United States "soft power" is in decline (Nye, 2004 and 2012). 
.    
We aim to analyze the dynamics and the scope of counterterrorist strategies which 
contemplate, on the one hand, the use of the military applied to executing terrorist 
targets - mainly directed to individuals who are "high value" targets - and, on the 
other, the core role of Intelligence both in prevention and in offensive counterterrorist 
action. 
Our analysis will focus on the two counterterrorist strategies which contemplate the use 
of this strategy: that of the United States and that of Israel. 
In the first case, and with added “efficiency” after 2009, the use of targeted killing11
 
 in 
Pakistan and in Yemen. As far as Israel is concerned, the counterterrorist response to 
the threat of Palestinian terrorism - in particular from groups such as the Hamas 
(Izzedin al-Qassam Brigades) the al-Aqsa Martyrs (al-Fatah) – or the Lebanese 
Hezbollah.  
Antiterrorism versus Counterterrorism 
A State's response to terrorism results from the convergence of preventative, pro-
active and reactive actions. However, often doubts persist as far as the conceptual 
framework and the differences, if any, between the terms antiterrorism and 
counterterrorism.    
According to Baud, counterterrorism is the activity “qui est l`ensemble des mesures 
destinées à combattre le terrorisme en amont de l`action terroriste. Il est la 
composante préventive de l`action et implique une combinaison de mesures politiques, 
des méthodes très pointues d`infiltration des réseaux et de recherche de 
renseignement active” (Baud, 2005: 298). It includes, therefore, the measures taken to 
prevent or eliminate the phenomenon upstream of terrorist action. It is the pro-active 
component which includes, among others, infiltrating networks or cells and the 
research and active collection of information through human sources (HUMINT)  
Antiterrorism “rassemble les moyens de lutte en aval de l`action terroriste. Il est la 
composante préemptive et réactive de l`action, et résulte souvent d`un échec d`une 
                                                        
9  In general terms, intelligent power is viewed as the "combination of the hard power of coercion and 
payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction." (Nye, 2012: 14). 
10 See Term used by Guedes, Armando M. (2012), “Política e Segurança: teorias e conjunturas da 
actualidade”. Paper presented on 14 March at the Seminar on Political Power and Security (Seminário O 
Poder Político e a Segurança). Lisboa: ISCPSI. 
11  “A Targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their 
agents acting under color of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific 
individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator. (…) States have adopted policies, either 
openly or implicitly, of using targeted killings, including in the territories of other States”. See United 
Nations HRC (2010), “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Philip Alston”. General Assembly: Human Rights Council -HRC/14/24Add.6, 28 May, p. 4.However, 
“targeted killing” is not a term defined under international law. Nor does it fit neatly into any particular 
legal framework. It came into common usage in 2000, after Israel made public a policy of “targeted 
killings” of alleged terrorists in the Occupied Palestinian Territories”, See Idem, Ibid. 
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stratégie de contreterrorisme” (Baud, 2005: 298-299). It is the reactive component12
 Loureiro dos Santos considers that this conceptual dichotomy is resolved by the use of 
the umbrella term "response to terrorism", in which he establishes four "strategic axes 
of simultaneous action", one of them more important for management and 
stabilization, in case of a successful terrorist action, mainly focusing on "emergence and 
aid measures to implement" (Santos, 2009: 165-171).  
, 
downstream of terrorist action, that is almost always placed into practice after the 
failure of a counterterrorist action. 
 the remaining three axes of strategic action would then be reserved to act on:  
 
1)  "deep causes" of terrorism in an attempt to (re)balance in terms of "political, 
economic and social measures";  
2)  ideological struggle against violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment; and  
3)  the offensive perspective which includes essentially information, the police forces, 
the judiciary - the military, either additionally or in situations which require the use 
of exceptional means (Santos, Ibidem). 
 
A document by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff defines both concepts as separate: 
antiterrorism includes "the defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of people 
and goods to terrorist attacks"; counterterrorism includes "offensive measures to 
prevent, stop and respond to terrorism"13. From this point of view, the fight against 
terrorism is the set of actions – antiterrorist or counterterrorist - implemented to stop 
the terrorist phenomenon in the full scope of the threat14
However, and considering the previous definitions, the symbiosis between the concepts 
and the scope of action may lead to different analyses which immediately influence the 
understanding of the phenomenon and the adequacy of the means used in response. In 
this sense, we have adopted the following integrated concept
. 
15
 
, both of the 
phenomenon and the response:  
“Terrorism is a gray-area phenomenon, something between crime and 
war, state violence and insurgent violence, conflict and violence, and 
propaganda and direct action. It is often intermeshed with other 
phenomena, such as migration, competition for resources, social 
                                                        
12 From the “recovery” perspective and that of tactical intervention or of Intelligence, in particular in the 
case of multiple or coordinated attacks or in case of strong indication or confirmed threat of new attacks.   
13  See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (1993), Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism - JP 3-
07.2, 25 de June, p. I-1. In the same document, the concept of terrorism is also restated in DOD Directive 
O-2000.12, as "The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or 
to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or 
ideological". 
14  See Ibidem. 
15 In an attempt to conceptualize political science, terrorism may be viewed as "(...) an action technique 
used against human targets, selected or random, through especially violent means, or the threat of their 
use, or specifically against non-human targets such as physical, critical or symbolic infrastructures, raising 
terror and insecurity which affects not only the primary targets, their direct victims, but also potential 
targets, indirectly coercing the action of governments and organizations and influencing public opinion so 
as to achieve their political, ideological, criminal or religious objectives"; See (Matos 2012, 2011). 
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movements and social protest, political and religious ideology, mass 
media and electronic communication, ethnic conflict and identity or 
single-issue politics, subversion, insurgency and revolution, and self-
determination of peoples and nations. (...) Countering terrorism is 
intimately related to understanding the nature of the terrorist 
phenomenon and how it fits into the wider security environment. How 
we conceive of terrorism determines to a great extent how we go about 
countering it and what resources we devote to the effort” (Crelinsten, 
2009: 39).  
  
The difference in concept, which is often more a case of semantics, is today overcome 
by the general use of the term "counterterrorism" which includes, regardless of its 
operational or linguistic origin, both vectors - preventative and responsive - in any of 
its stages.  
The counterterrorist efficiency is necessarily dependent on the correct perception of 
both the nature and the strategic implications of the phenomenon within a wide 
security framework. Once these objectives are met, the adequate response strategies 
could be designed as well as the most efficient resources could be selected for its fight.  
 
The Outline of the Threat 
Al-Qaeda is currently a hybrid, flexible and extremely versatile structure in 
organizational terms, known for its decentralized action and node transversality, with 
few links among cells allowing, based on the regional and local nodes, for the creation 
of new identities from already existing ones or the reproduction of identities, 
structurally simple but complex in terms of action and vertically independent, for 
operational and logistics purposes, in terms of command or leadership in planning and 
executing terrorist attacks (Matos, 2012). 
The organization, and its associated groups, are a key-element of the global threat 
which the Jihadist terrorism16 - of international scope17
                                                        
16 Members, groups and organizations share, besides the Islamic faith, a political and ideological activism 
based on an extreme and revivalist interpretation of the teachings of the Koran, in particular the Salafist 
perspective. (Matos, 2011: p.15). The term "Jihadist Terrorism" is commonly used to designate a variant 
of international terrorism based on an extremist interpretation of Islam to support political and ideological 
objectives whose origin and scope of action are not limited to any particular geographical area. However, 
it must not be viewed as equivalent to other forms of Islamic terrorism, as is the case of the group 
Hamas, whose objectives are different from those of bin Laden and al-Qaeda and focus on particular 
political objectives: the Palestinian cause (Matos, 2011: 15-16; Moghadam, 2008: 94). 
 and Islamic influence - has long 
represented and which is implemented and disseminated under the ideological umbrella 
17 International terrorism is that whose aim is to affect the political structure of more than a country, even 
the world, when participants have spread their action to a significant number of countries or geographical 
areas.  Noteworthy is the fact that international terrorism, in these terms, necessarily includes 
transnational terrorism. See (Matos, 2011: 14-15; Reinares, 2005:  2). It also includes that which 
“involves more than one nation, either in terms of national identity of the perpetrators or victims, or when 
the attack is committed on the territory of a third-party country, or if a state sponsor of terrorism is 
involved in the attacks”. See Ganor (2005: 57). 
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of the acclaimed "Global Jihad"18, started against the West in general and against the 
Jews and the Crusades19
Al-Qaeda, in terms of its central structure
 in particular.  
20 - upstream and downstream of the 
"common" hierarchical and network models - appears to have adopted a design close to 
that of the "dune structure" (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005: 275-284), whose (re)structure 
is different from the pyramid structure the organization had in the first stage of its 
existence21
 
, and that of the network structure it adopted up to the attacks on 
September 11, 2001. This changed the organization into a hybrid and versatile 
structure whose inconsistency has allowed it to, on the one hand, be physically 
implemented yet structurally absent at global level and, on the other hand, have a 
"present" though virtual leadership (Matos, 2012). Thus, the concept of a dune 
organization is inspired on the deterritorialized character of a (new) globalized world 
which fosters the adoption of these organizational dynamics by terrorist groups:  
“The Dune movement is almost random, moving from one territory to 
another, affecting each territory, changing its characteristics and moves 
on to the next destination (…) act in a dynamics of a fast-moving entity 
that associates and dissociates itself with local elements while creating a 
global effect. The never ending associative connections link the Dune Al 
Qaeda as a Dune Organization in a decentralized and networked way 
with unknown number of affiliated groups. This network is temporary, 
attaches and detaches, moving onward after changing the environment 
in which it has acted. Afterward, it moves on while looking for another 
suitable environment for the Dune to act in” (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005). 
 
The threat of Islamic terrorism, according to some experts, results from three 
overlapping circles: the first, at the core, includes the members of the network al-
Qaeda22 and its affiliates; the second includes ethnical and nationalistic groups which 
share al-Qaeda's ideology but whose objectives are local or regional; finally, a third 
circle, rather undefined but probably the largest and most dangerous, which includes 
individuals and groups who do "freelancer terrorism" (Bures quoting Errera, 2011: 37-
39)23
This wide typology would include the so-called "lone-wolves", individuals who commit 
terrorist actions and: 1) operate individually; 2) have no connection to any terrorist 
group or organization; 3) do not act under the direct influence of a leader or structured 
hierarchy; 4) use tactics and methods they have designed and implemented, without 
.  
                                                        
18 In Arabic, it means "effort in the search for the path of God; more extreme Islam sees it as a Holy War 
against the enemies of Islamic faith". See Costa, Hélder Santos (2003), O Martírio no Islão. Lisboa: 
ISCSP: 36. 
19  The reference being Israel and the United States. 
20  There is top and intermediate leadership, i.e., besides the directing structure there is a group of 
operationals, experienced and highly trained, who are responsible for areas such as recruitment and 
radicalization, religious affairs, financial operations, propaganda and strategic communication, terrorist 
training and operation planning in Europe, Africa, etc. 
21 Since its creation in 1988 up to the terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The "Afghan Service 
Bureau" - or MAK or Makhtab al-Khimadat - created by  Abdullah Azzam during the conflict with the 
Soviets, was its root. 
22  Usually referred to as “al-Qaeda Core”. 
23  Errera, Philippe (2005) “Three Circles of Threat”, Survival 47 (1): 71-88. 
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influence of supervision of others (COT, 2007). "Freelancer" acts are those carried out 
by individuals who, though they do not have a direct relation with a terrorist 
organization, act under the tactical and operational guidance of one of its members 
(Jenkins, 2011: VII).  
In an expert's prospective analysis, al-Qaeda, though weakened, still aims at a global 
terror campaign. Though currently it is not able to launch large scale attacks, difficult to 
plan and implement, the organization invests on homegrown recruitment for an 
individual Jihad based on a "do-it-yourself" terrorism (Jenkins, 2011; Matos, 2012).  
Considering Europe, and in particular the threat of endogenous or homegrown 
terrorism, the classification into three types of cells in Europe is rather interesting: 
 
Figure 1 - Types of terrorist cells operating in Europe 
 AUTONOMY SELECTION 
Chain of command Directed Top-down 
Guided Takes initiative, but 
seeks approval 
Self-recruited, but "link 
to jihad" 
Self-starter Autonomous Self-selected 
Source: Neumann & Brook (2007: p. 26) 
 
"Command cells", formed and run by the top hierarchy, aim to carry out actions 
planned by the command and under its coordination. Its operationals have been trained 
by the organization in camps, either already set up or especially built, and they may 
remain "dormant" until activated. 
 The "commanded cells" are usually self-recruited and self-radicalized, have autonomy 
in terms of initiative but require approval by the organization. They view the approval 
as a means of becoming integrated in the structure and, in the future, as a possible 
access to logistics or financial support.  Though not formally integrated in the 
organizing structure, these cells share ideology, logistics and operational strategies for 
supervision and control with the organization or with some of its members. 
"Autonomous cells" - created "automatically" or spontaneously - are exclusively self-
recruited and self-radicalized. Its members have no connection with the organization 
and are trained at their own volition, almost always in a "virtual camp", which leads to 
the majority of their initiatives being limited to planning and target approach. 
However, this last type of cell becomes exponentially dangerous due to its ability to be 
integrated in society. Acting autonomously and uncoordinatedly, their visibility is lower 
and the monitoring of their members' movements only occurs when more extreme 
ideologies and narratives are inflated or actions are carried out that evidence their 
availability to terrorism ( Neumann & Brook, 2007: 23-26)24
Another perspective, more misleading, divides this threat into two subtypes: the 
"outsiders" and the "insiders". The first would include individuals, exiled, refugees or 
students, who can enter and remain in countries from Western Europe; the second 
would include second and third generation immigrants from the Arab Diaspora (Bures, 
quoting Leiken, 2011: 38). 
. 
                                                        
24  Also quoted by Bures (2011: 37-38). 
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This variant is undoubtedly and intimately related with the Diaspora of the Islamic 
community which settled in Europe long ago. We cannot, nevertheless, establish a 
cause effect relation, the more so because the extremists represent a very low 
percentage of a mostly integrated community.  
We may also divide the formation of these cells in Europe as follows: 
External penetration cells: small groups of individuals already somewhat organized, 
who cross the borders of a State or region - with the support of the Islamic community 
settled there, at least in terms of logistics, cover and financing - and have a previously 
established target. They are an external threat, unpredictable and of difficult detection 
and control due to their heterogeneous nature and its members' professional skills. In 
general, they enter the target country at a date close to the attack, requiring just 
enough time for approach, recognition, counter-surveillance, security test and 
execution25. These cells usually include elements of different nationalities but in which 
one is predominant26
Endogenous cells include this subtype of autonomous cells, either active or 
"dormant", formed by elements of first or second generation immigrant community. 
These cells emerge in the context of sharing ethnic, nationalistic or religious values and 
are fostered by friendship, neighborhood or even family relations. Many members share 
a past life of crime, which has enabled or quickened their recruitment, doctrination and 
violent radicalization. These cells are formed in neighborhood communities, connected 
through the Internet (through social media and Islamic discussion forums) and rather 
easily "camouflaged" because of members' social and family insertion. They are very 
mobile, either in pendular movements between Europe and the country of their family 
or within that very country. 
. 
 
Offensive Terrorism: from efficiency to the "boomerang" effect 
A counterterrorist strategy may be efficient within a specific context and completely 
inefficient in another, given the heterogeneous nature of the phenomenon, both in 
terms of the individuals involved and the action itself.   
 
"Even relatively ineffective terrorist attacks can do grave harm. The 
damage can be measured in lives lost or injuries, in property damage 
and other material costs, or in something less easily quantifiable – the 
fear that another attack is coming. (...) mounting effective counters to 
terrorism is an especially difficult task. Because of the stealth and 
surprise that accompanies terrorism, the anonymity of the attackers, 
and the frequent willingness of terrorists to die for their cause, tackling 
terrorism is daunting at best. (...) The list of possible counterterrorism 
                                                        
25  Some of these actions are often carried out by other elements of the terrorist group, usually referred to as 
"information cell". For security reasons and for the success of the operation, no contact should be 
established with elements of the cell executing the attack.   
26 As an example, we may mention the "penetration cell" responsible for the 9/11 attacks on American soil: 
though "commanded" by the Egyptian Atta, of the cell's 19 members, 14 were Saudi. See McDermott, 
Terry (2005) Perfect Soldiers. The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It. New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers.  
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strategies is long and growing, in part because of the evolving dynamics 
of the terrorist threat” (Banks et Alii, 2008: 3). 
 
It is in this sense that Crelinsten27
Equally important is that, in the design of a counterterrorist policy, not only are basic 
analytical perspectives taken into account - time, space, types of power and modes of 
intervention of the opposing party - but also dichotomies such as offensive/defensive, 
reactive/proactive, local/global, which serve as basis for adjusting the focus of action 
and the intensity of the response. (Crelinsten, 2009: 44-47).  
 presents different action focuses which, though 
towards a shared end - the counterterrorist response - allow to implement the most 
adequate strategies, not only as far as the specificities of the phenomenon at each 
moment and of the specific actor involved, but also in terms of the depth and scope of 
its application. This means that if it focuses on short term objectives - group analysis - 
abilities and means of acting, motivation, targets, etc - or, if it aims a wider and long 
term objective, analysis should include social, religious, political or economic factors 
that frame the context of terrorist action so as to better understand and act on its 
causes, action abilities and counter-response to a State's counterterrorist action 
(Crelinsten, 2009: 45). 
In general terms, Crelinsten subdivides counterterrorism into 5 categories: coercive, 
proactive, persuasive, defensive and "long term". 
Coercive counterterrorism, the most relevant for us, is essentially offensive and based 
on two models: the War Model28, which favors the use of the military, and the "Criminal 
Justice"29, clearly based on the police and the judiciary30
The advocates of the "criminal" model argue that terrorism should be treated as any 
other type of organized and violent criminal activity. The defense of the "military" 
model is based on the assumption that the previous model does not have the means, in 
the majority of cases, to deal with the threat, which is why its protagonists should be 
seen as fighters - since the civil population is their random target - and the response 
tools adequate to armed conflict. 
.  
Though both models are related with the monopoly of the use of force by the State, in 
both cases there are restrictions to their actions: in the former, the restraints are those 
deriving from criminal legislation and criminal procedure; in the latter, military force 
should only be used against fighting targets or, by extension, against individuals who 
provide them with military support. 
For Ganor, a world specialist on counterterrorism, any counterterrorist policy, by 
definition, should meet the following objectives:   
 
                                                        
27  Crelinsten, Ronald (2009), Counterterrorism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
28  “The war model of counterterrorism treats terrorism as if it were an act of war or insurgency. Because 
wars are usually fought between states, countering terrorism within a war model implies that the terrorist 
group represents the equivalent of a state.” See Crelinsten(2009: 72-73). 
29  “A criminal justice approach to counterterrorism treats terrorism as a crime. This makes perfect sense, 
since most terrorist acts constitute crimes defined in criminal codes.” See Crelinsten (Idem: 52). 
30 Here, considered as a whole; i.e. legislative corpus, the judiciary, the prison system, prevention 
subsystems and criminal investigation, information, etc. 
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1)  eradicate terrorism;  
2)  minimize the damages caused by its actions;  
3)  prevent the increase in terrorist action (Ganor, 2005: 25-27).  
 
According to this, the "terrorist equation"31 paradoxically leads us to the dilemma of the 
"counterterrorist equation": that in which the increase in offensive action to reduce the 
action of a group or organization will lead to more support and motivation. Therefore, a 
counterterrorist strategy should attempt to balance the means to crush an 
organization's operational ability to terrorism and, on the other, reduce the level of 
motivation to carry out those actions32
A State which adopts an offensive policy of counterterrorism must equally take into 
account the "boomerang effect". According to Ganor (2005: 129-130), the "boomerang 
effect" theory establishes that offensive action against a terrorist organization may 
trigger an escalation of response - more attacks and often more lethal ones - by the 
organization.  
. 
Nevertheless, advocates of the use of offensive actions state that this is not valid, 
considering that the variable limiting the scope of action and the modus operandi of a 
terrorist organization is its operational ability to attack and not particularly its degree of 
motivation.  
Thus, “the motivation of terrorists is always high and attacks are committed solely as 
result of operational readiness. A serious blow to the terrorist organization`s 
infrastructure will jeopardize its operational capability, and even if it elevates the 
organization`s motivation to commit a counter-attack, it will not be able to act on it” 
(Ganor, Ibidem).  
To sum up, this is a matter which is far from consensual. The "decapitation" - through 
elimination or capture - of leading members of terrorist organizations' has long been 
claimed for. The contention is that this would weaken the organizations' ability to plan 
and carry out actions as well as their integrity and organizing cohesion. We believe, 
however, that this will lead to better results when the target organization has a more or 
less defined hierarchy. In the case of al-Qaeda and the terrorist nebula33 linked to it, 
the results may be less efficient given the inconsistency34 and little connectivity35
                                                        
31 This is made visible in the formula: [Terrorism = Motivation + Operational Ability]; See Ganor (2005: 41- 
43). 
 of its 
organizational model. 
32  “(…) the offensive activity raises the organization`s motivation to continue perpetrating, and perhaps 
even to escalate, terrorist activity in retaliation and in response to the country`s actions. (…) Planning 
and carrying out effective offensive counter-terrorism activity is a complex task and difficult to achieve.” 
See Ganor (Idem: 43).  
33 Term proposed long ago by DENÉCÉ, Éric et al. [dir.] (2002). Guerre Secrète Contre Al-Qaeda. Centre 
Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement. Paris: Ellipses Édition: 29 e161-163. 
34 This organizational inconsistency, which Jessica Stern designated as "The Protean Enemy", allowed al-
Qaeda to resist - at least until the death of bin Laden - to successive counterterrorist, military and 
Intelligence operations carried out against its top leaders in the Afghan and Pakistani area. See Matos, 
Hermínio J. (2012) “E Depois de bin Laden? Implicações Estratégicas no Fenómeno Terrorista 
Internacional Uma Reflexão”. Politeia, Year VIII: 9-38. Lisboa: ISCPSI, p. 24; STERN, Jessica, “The 
Protean Enemy”, Foreign Affairs, 82 (4), 2003: 27-40. 
35  For a thorough and detailed analysis of the organizational models of terrorist structures, see GUEDES, 
Armando Marques (2007), Ligações Perigosas. Conectividade, Coordenação e Aprendizagem em Redes 
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Offensive Responses 
The threat of terrorism caught the West off guard; the most common means to make 
war today, in this area, are of little or no use (Statman, 2004: 179). Adriano Moreira 
described this impasse in the conflict as the complex "relation between the 
International System and the world Strategic Context, in which the distance between 
the normative definition of the system and world reality" (Moreira, 2011: 433), which 
inevitably leads us to a "gap between reality and the dimension of the threat due to it 
being underestimated" (Tomé, 2010: 37).  
Thus, there seems to be a disturbing, maybe paradoxical, element in the fight against 
terrorism: on the one hand, groups emerge and disseminate, complex organizational 
strategies and models are adopted which allow for increased resistance and efficiency 
in terrorist action; on the other hand, counterterrorist models are implemented which 
simultaneously lead to more effective results yet are controversial in terms of 
legitimacy and legality. 
Therefore, the reformulation of the paradigm of security, here in its holistic perspective, 
may (re)structure the response policies to terrorism and the risk of "militarization of 
non-military dimensions of security"36
The issue here is to know whether the responses by some States, through the adoption 
of active measures of offensive counterterrorism - as, for example, the use of "targeted 
killing" - are not simply another form of terrorism? 
. "The symbolism attached to the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the international community, used to a balance of terror, is forced to acknowledge 
the importance of other actors in the international system" (Garcia, 2010: 72), which 
include, inter alia, terrorist groups and organizations such as al-Qaeda and associated 
movement.  
As Guedes Valente writes, when discussing this dialogue, sometimes antithetic, 
between National Security and the defense of basic rights, "neither can security be 
underestimated, nor can basic rights be sacrificed endlessly."  (Valente, 2010: 55). 
Thus, and as stated in a United Nations37 report  by rapporteur Philip Alston38 on 
"Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions", at international level it is admissible 
to use this type of offensive response against international terrorism, either per se or in 
armed conflicts which oppose State and non-state actors, scenarios in which the 
specificity of the threat and the basic rules of war and peace, which remind us now of 
the (re)emerging concept of "asymmetric war"39
                                                                                                                                                                          
Terroristas. Coimbra: Almedina. See also Matos  (2010), “O Sistema de Segurança Interna: O Caso 
Português”, in Moreira, Adriano e Ramalho Pinto [coord.] ESTRATÉGIA, Vol. XIX: 173-246. Lisboa: 
Instituto Português da Conjuntura Estratégica, p. 206 onwards. [quoting GUEDES, 2007: 47-58]. 
, precisely that in which military force 
36  Tomé (2010: 37). 
37  See United Nations (2010), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Philip Alston. General Assembly: Human Rights Council -HRC/14/24Add.6, 28 May: 3-5.  
38 Special Rapporteur, between August 2004 and July 2010, of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Currently (since July 2010), the task is carried out by Christof Heyns, 
from South Africa 
39  For Garcia (Quoting Rupert Smith, 2010: 86), "classifying a war as asymmetric is a euphemism, because 
the art of war is in [always] managing an asymmetry in relation to the enemy" (our brackets and 
underlining); "Asymmetric war (...) mostly explores the surprise factor, refuses the rules of combat 
imposed by the adversary, uses unforeseen means and acts on places where confrontation should be 
unlikely", essential requirement in any terrorist organization's strategy (Garcia, Ibid.). 
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is deemed necessary though the "battle field" is not in the territory of the aggressor or 
the victim but in third States, where the former seeks refuge and support at all levels. 
We are referring to the use of "targeted killing"40 as an offensive action tool in 
counterterrorist strategies of some countries, as the United States and Israel41
The United Nations Report defines this action tool as follows:  
. 
 
 “A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of 
lethal force, by States or their agents acting under color of law, or by an 
organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual 
who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator. (…) Such policies 
have been justified both as a legitimate response to terrorist threats and 
as a necessary response to the challenges of asymmetric warfare. In the 
legitimate struggle against terrorism, too many criminal acts have been 
re-characterized so as to justify addressing them within the framework 
of the law of  armed conflict. New technologies, and especially unarmed 
combat aerial vehicles or drones, have been added into this mix, by 
making it easier to kill targets, with fewer risks to the targeting State.” 
(UN Report, 2010: 3). 
 
We use the concept by Melzer (2008: 3-5) which states that, for an action to be 
referred to as “targeted killing” it should fulfill five requirements:  
 
1) the use of lethal force;  
2) premeditated and deliberate intent to kill;  
3) previous selection of individual targets;  
4) non-physical possession of the target;  
5) accountability of the action by a subject of international law. 
 
Therefore, besides the definition proposed by the United Nations Report, though not 
very different,  
 
“The term ‘targeted killing’ denotes the use of lethal force attributable to 
a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and 
deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the 
physical custody of those targeting them” (Melzer, Idem: 5). 
 
                                                        
40 We opted to keep the Anglo-Saxon terminology because we believe the translation would imply a loss, if 
not in its conceptual efficiency, at least in terms of its "psychological" scope. Other designations include 
"selective killing", "selected target elimination", "extrajudicial executions" and "selective targets". 
41 Other countries such as France, Russia and the United Kingdom have made (or still make) use of this 
"offensive action technique". NATO, within the scope of its action in Afghanistan, is the more current 
example.  
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 3, n.º 2 (fall 2012), pp. 114-138    
Offensive Counterterrorism. Targeted killing in eliminating terrorist targets: the case of the USA and Israel 
Hermínio Matos 
 127 
 
The theory of "just war", nowadays within the framework of Human International Law, 
the International Law on Armed Conflict, The United Nations Charter and the Geneva 
Conventions, associates self-defense and the principles of need and proportionality. The 
United Nations forbid the threat or use of force against the independence or territory 
integrity of other States. It includes, however, two exceptions:  
 
1)  individual or collective right of response to an armed attack, laid down by article 
51 of the Charter, which allows the use of force only as a response to an armed 
attack or, ultimately, as "anticipatory defense" to an imminent armed attack;  
2)  the use of force in collective security operations, previously authorized by the 
Security Council. 
 
Anchored in these "three subtypes of security trend" - the "Law and Order Movement, 
the Zero Tolerance and the police-State" - the "new threats and new dangers (...) are 
jeopardizing common Criminal Law and legitimizing the defense of the enemy's 
Criminal Law, based on the dogma of the author's Criminal Law, (...) which should be 
viewed as an enemy because representing a danger, a threat, a risk to security". We, 
therefore, run the risk of changing "terrorism as the root of war schizophrenia" which 
thus promotes the most offensive counterterrorist response (Valente, 2010:  62-67). 
Though the legal framework of this issue is under deep and endless debate, especially 
considering human international law and human rights, our analysis will only focus on 
the technical and tactical issues involved in this type of counterterrorist action. 
 
The Target Selection Process 
According to US military doctrine, a "target" is an entity or object whose approach is 
susceptible of immediate or future execution (FM, 3-60, 2010: 1-1). In this rather wide 
category we may include military forces, mobile or stationary, physical structures, 
critical infrastructures or other capacities deemed necessary to meet the adversary or 
enemy's strategic or operational objectives (JP 3-60, 2002:  I-2).  
 The process of target selection - "Targeting" - therefore encompasses the set of 
actions to identify, select and define current or future target priorities which, when 
carried out, are able to destroy, damage or decrease the opponent's abilities (FM 3-60:  
Ibidem).  
Targets' abilities necessarily include the human means at their disposal, whether 
individuals belonging to an army - regular or insurgent - or to a terrorist organization. 
The advantages of a target selection process are, among others: the ability to identify 
sources or resources allowing an opponent, from the conflict perspective, to carry out 
actions and use resources and abilities. This makes its application extremely efficient 
within the scope of offensive counterterrorism. 
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Therefore, the selection of "high value targets" 42
The process is divided into essentially four stages: 
 aims at approaching (elimination or 
capture) of individuals in directing or leadership positions and are an asset in either 
technical or operational terms within a terrorist organization. 
 
Figure 2 - Methodology D3A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our design, See FM-3-60 (2010: p. 2-1) 
 
D3A methodology cycle is:  
1)  DECIDE - decide on the target;  
2) DETECT - detect and establish the target;  
3) DELIVER - lead the operation (approach the target); 
4) ASSESS – effects/damages in the approach (“have” the target). 
 
 The dynamics of this process, whose cycle can be longer or shorter, may be simplified 
in this formula:  “Find, Fix and Finish”43
 
.  
HUMINT offensive perspective: successes and (some) failures 
On 31 December 2009, Humam Khalil al-Balawi, a Jordan doctor who had supposedly 
been recruited by GID44 as a double agent to infiltrate the terrorist organization al-
Qaeda, committed a suicide attack45
                                                        
42  High-Value Target (HVT): “Those assets that the Enemy Commander requires for successful completion of 
his mission”; High-Payoff Target (HPT): “Those HVT`s that must be acquired and successfully attacked to 
achieve the Friendly Commander`s mission” See FM 3-60 (2010), The Targeting Process, p. 2-2. 
 and exploded at the  Khost military station, in 
43  “Find: find the enemy; Fix: Ensure the enemy stays (is fixed) in that location; Finish: Defeat the enemy”. 
See Peritz, Aki, Eric Rosenbach (2012) Find, Fix, Finish. Inside The Counterterrorism Campaigns That 
Killed Bin Laden and Devastated Al-Qaeda. New York: Public Affairs.  
44  The Jordan Information Service, whose acronym is General Intelligence Directorate or Mukhabarat. One of 
the al-Balawi victims was exactly his handler, an agent of the Jordanian services and a cousin of the 
Jordanian King Abdullah II, Ali bin Zeid.  
45  According to a recording by al-Balawi immediately before the attack, he claimed avenging the death of 
the terrorist group leader Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baitullah Mehsud, in August 2009, the target of 
a “targeted killing” action by Drones. See Warrick, Joby (2011) The Triple Agent, The al-Qaeda Mole Who 
Infiltrated The CIA. New York: Doubleday.  
Decide 
Detect Deliver 
Assess 
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Afghanistan, eliminating the whole CIA team in the region, who was then expecting his 
contact for information collection.  
This incident illustrates the complexity of counterterrorism intelligence46
In the fight against terrorism, in particular that of Islam, the technology that most 
information services today have is incomplete without the Intelligence that is HUMINT.  
, especially in 
HUMINT actions. 
Within the scope of the selection process of terrorist targets, Intelligence plays a crucial 
role in all its phases. However, it is in the infiltration of human sources of information in 
terrorist organizations or groups - or at least in their scope of action - that the process 
becomes difficult, not only due to the secrecy and closeness that are typical of these 
activities but also due to the specific features - linguistic, ethnic and religious - of the 
Jihadist terrorist circuit. 
Ultimately, Intelligence seeks the most important for terrorism prevention: location and 
identification of elements from a terrorist organization whose knowledge, in advance or 
in time, will allow, on the one hand, canceling the action and, on the other, ruining its 
structuring and to capturing its members. 
The most important use of Intelligence in counterterrorism is, thus, to gather and make 
available the information on terrorists, individuals, leaders, cells or groups, so as to 
break them up.  
Paradoxically, the elimination of a terrorist target is not always the best option. The 
information which may be gathered - on the organization's structure, its members, 
plans of action, etc. - based on the "interviewing" of captured elements is important47
 
.  
“Many intelligence and military officials argue that detaining and 
interviewing terrorists suspects is the most effective way to finish them, 
since they can provide information that will allow the find-fix-finish cycle 
to begin again; the debriefing of one suspect can aid in locating, 
isolating, capturing, or killing others” (Peritz & Rosenbach, 2012: 8 e 
207-218). 
 
HUMINT has therefore an important role in counterterrorism. Obtaining information 
from sources connected to 48
                                                        
46 The whole concept is visible here: information as a process (in general, the so-called "information cycle"), 
as the final product of this process (Knowledge) and from the functional perspective of the organizations 
carrying it out. See (Matos, 2011: 16). 
the structures of terrorist organizations allows access to 
precise and updated information on their structure, abilities and plans of action (Ganor, 
2012: 155-156). 
47 This is the case of the interrogation to Khalid Sheik Mohammed and later to Abu Faraj al-Libi, which may 
have led to identifying and locating bin Laden's "personal courier" - Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti - and, 
consequently, to the elimination of al-Qaeda's leader in May 2011.    
48 This "connection" to the source of the organization can be twofold: through a HUMINT infiltration process, 
in which the infiltration movement is operated from the outside to the inside of the organization. On the 
other hand, "penetrating" an organization can only be achieved when someone from the inside or 
someone with access to it can be "recruited". Frequently, both terms - infiltration and penetration - are 
used random and alternately. The infiltration process is harder to carry out, though, in counterterrorism, 
success is difficult to achieve in both cases. 
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Usually, targeted killing actions are part of a wider plan of action - beyond the action of 
"special forces" - with special focus on HUMINT and "Covert49 & Clandestine50
 
 
Operations". In the case of the USA, it is not uncommon for the CIA to lead the 
operations of "targeted killing" in the field, including coordination and leadership of 
attacks by drones. 
“Targeted Killing”  
The United States 
The United States has come a long way since 9/11 up to now in terms of restructuring 
their foreign and security and defense policies. 
As stated in their 2011 National Counterterrorist Strategy51, the American 
administration faces today "the world as it is"52 but does not give up from the attempt 
to make it "the world we seek"53
Part of the US military response to 9/11 terrorist attacks, though under the name 
"Global War on Counterterrorism" (GWOT), the air raids on the mountains of 
Afghanistan (where al-Qaeda top leaders were supposedly hidden) are the beginning of 
what later, in an offensive clearly directed against selected terrorist targets, would be 
designated targeted killing. 
. 
Despite the shadow of the American administration counterterrorist action being spread 
throughout the globe, the use of this tool is reserved to specific operation fields as, for 
example, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.  
 
Pakistan & Yemen 
In a short analysis of the results obtained by the USA within counterterrorism - through 
targeted killing by drones54 - in Pakistan and Yemen, an exponential increase in the 
number of attacks between 2004-2012, particularly after 2008, is visible. The (high) 
estimate for the period between 2004 and 2012, in particular in the Pakistani territory, 
is a total of 3,19155
                                                        
49  “Covert operations are defined as an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity 
of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.  A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in 
that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the 
operation”; See U.S. Department of Defense (2010) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint 
Publication 1-02: 88. 
 deaths, including "militants", "civilians" and "unknown". 
50 “Clandestine operation as an operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies 
in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.  A clandestine operation differs from a covert 
operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the 
identity of the sponsor.  In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may 
focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities.” See Idem, Ibid, p. 56. 
51 U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism, Washington D.C.: White House, June 2011: 1-2. 
52  “The World as It Is”. See U.S. National Security Strategy, Washington D.C.: White House, May 2010: 7-9.  
53  “The World We Seek”. See U.S. National Security Strategy, Washington D.C.: White House, May 2010: 9-
16.  
54  Manufactured by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc., in San Diego, the most used by the USA are 
MQ-1B Predator (CIA) and MQ-9 Reaper (USAF). Usually referred to as UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), 
they are also used for ISR (Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance) VISINT (Visual Intelligence) 
operations. Both may be armed with Hellfire missiles, the MQ-9 Reaper may also have laser guided 
bombs. See Llenza, Michael Steven (2011) “Targeted Killings in Pakistan: A Defense”, Global Security 
Studies: 47-59, Vol. 2 (2): 48-49.  
55  Data source: http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (data reported to 01 October 2012). 
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Noteworthy is also the increase in the "precision" of "selected" target execution, since, 
in 2012, the number of "civilian" casualties - frequently named "collateral damages" - is 
zero according to the referred data source.  
 The beginning of the Obama administration coincides with the increase in attacks and 
in deaths among militants or terrorist leaders56
Therefore, between 2004 and 2012, the USA eliminated, through executing selected 
targets, forty-nine individuals from the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Haqqani directing 
structures
. 
57
In the case of Yemen, the USA began their drone attack campaign in November 2002. 
That month, the first victim was Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi. Since then, fifty-one 
attacks have been launched, leading to two hundred and sixty-seven eliminated 
terrorists, among leaders and operationals, and eighty-two civilian casualties
.  
58
 
. 
Israel 
In an analogy with the metaphor used by Nye59, we could say that Israel sleeps with an 
elephant60
The project of the State of Israel has been ab initio an endless political and military 
confrontation with neighboring Arab states, in particular with those next to its 
geographical borders. Most of the times, the confrontations have been in the form of 
terror actions against civilian or military targets in Israeli territory or against economic 
interests, critical infrastructures or Israeli citizens outside the country's borders. 
 by its side; the problem is if the animal turns in its sleep. 
This way, the terrorist threat on Israel is materialized through organizations or groups 
like the Hamas, particularly, through its "military arm" - the Izzedin al-Qassam 
Brigades - the al-Aqsa Martyr Brigade and the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah. 
From this point of view, its counterterrorist response strategy is essentially offensive, 
carried out by IDF (Israel Defense Forces), by Intelligence and by police forces. 
On 27 December 2011, IDF's61 page mentioned the elimination of two terrorist targets, 
Rami Daoud Jabar Khafarna and Hazam Mahmad Sa’adi Al-Shakr, members of the 
Sunni group Hamas, which were preparing a terrorist attack on the border between 
Israel and Egypt (in the Sinai peninsula). IDF classified the attack, carried out by an Air 
Force plane, as "surgical", adding in its official statement62
“The IDF will not allow any attempt to harm the State of Israel and IDF soldiers, and 
will continue to operate against anyone who uses terror against the State of Israel. The 
 that 
                                                        
56  In 2008, 35 attacks; in 2009, 53; in 2010, 117; in 2011, 64; and in 2012, 39 attacks. From 2008 to 
2012, there was a total of 308 attacks. Source: http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php 
(reporting to October 1, 2012).  
57  Source: Idem, Ibid. 
58 Source: http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php (reporting to October 
4, 2012). 
59  See NYE (2012), Op. Cit.: 26: "(...) Canadians complain that living next to the United States is like 
sleeping with an elephant. (...) if the monster turns, it will lead to harm". 
60  Especially Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and Iran, as well as the "old" threat from Palestinian terrorism. 
61  Israel Defense Forces: Israel Defense Forces is a term which includes the country's Army, the Navy and 
the Air Force. See www.idf.il/. 
62   Message always included at the end of news report related to terrorist action against Israel. In this sense, 
the "targeted killing" action, within the scope of counterterrorist response, is always publicly 
acknowledged by Israel. 
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Hamas terror organization is solely responsible for any terror activity emanating from 
the Gaza strip”63
Up to a point, we could consider the operation "Wrath of God"
. 
64 a distinctive feature in 
targeted killing actions by the State of Israel. The operation "Wrath of God", carried out 
by the Mossad, had a specific mission: “Committee X65 made the historic, but top 
secret decision to assassinate any Black September terrorists involved, directly or 
indirectly, in planning, assisting, or executing the attack at the Olympics. (...)  The 
mission was not to capture anyone. It was out-and-out revenge – to terrorize the 
terrorists”66
More recent cases, as the elimination of Hamas military leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in 
Dubai, in January 2010, or the recent case of the Iranian nuclear scientist, Mostafa 
Ahmadi-Roshan, this January, make evident, on the one hand, the difficulties faced by 
counter terrorist strategies in which the role of Intelligence is that of objective 
efficiency and, on the other,  legal, diplomatic and political restraints which, in 
unsuccessful cases as those mentioned, may weaken the image and positioning of a 
State within the international community. 
.  
The next figure (figure 3) shows the encompassing and coordinated Israel Intelligence 
community.  
Considering that most terror activity occurs in areas controlled by the Palestinian 
Authority, Israel attributes great importance to the protection of its territorial borders 
and to actions aiming to infiltrate them. Frequently, IDF penetrates Palestinian 
jurisdiction areas for arrests or armed interventions against terrorist targets, which can 
be an individual or a physical structure in which it is known they are hidden. In the 
latter case, operations even contemplate air support (preferably helicopters) for total 
destruction of the location. These actions are referred to as "house demolitions"67
 
. This 
type of intervention may imply huge collateral damages, i.e., the physical elimination of 
civilian targets and the physical destruction of adjoining buildings. In general, they are 
a response to rocket launching from the Gaza Strip against the State of Israel. 
  
                                                        
63  See “IAF aircraft target two Global Jihad affiliated-terrorists in northern Gaza who prepared attacks on 
Israel-Egypt border”, (27.12.2011): http://www.idf.il/1283-14340-EN/Dover.aspx. 
64 "Wrath of God" Name of the operation carried out by Mossad against those responsible for the terrorist 
attacks on the 1972 Israeli Olympic team in Munich - Black September group, whose leader, Ali Hassan 
Salameh ("The Red Prince"), would only be eliminated on 22 January 1979 in Lebanon, seven years after 
the beginning of the retaliation by "the long arm of the Israeli Justice".  
65  "Committee X", presided by Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, was top secret. 
66  See Raviv, Dan, Yossi Melman (1990) Every Spy A Prince, The Complete History of Israel`s Intelligence 
Community. Boston: Jaffe Book, p. 186; Payne, Ronald (1990) Mossad, Israel`s Most Secret Service. New 
York: Bantam Press. 
67  See Benmelech, Efraim et alli. (2009), “Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions”, 
Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper n.º 16493: 1-4. 
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Figure 3 - Israel Intelligence Community 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pedahzur (2010: p. 4) 
  
Besides this "heavy fire" method, the most lethal threats against Israeli targets are 
bombs and suicide attacks. Figure 4 shows the terrorist activity against Israel between 
June and September 2012, in "demarcated" areas such as Judea and Samaria, Sinai 
and the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. Though the number of attacks is significant, their 
lethal degree is rather low or null, except for a few cases, as a result of Israel's long 
experience in terrorism as well as of the country's increase in protective measures and 
offensive response, which has been in place for long.   
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Figure 4 - Perspective of terrorist attacks in Israel (June – September 2012)68
 
 
Source: www.shabak.gov.il 
 
According to the report mentioned above, and though there was an increase in terrorist 
activity in October when compared to July and August, the total number of successful 
attacks was much lower than 165, the number of attacks in June. 
However, for this period, and taking into account the total of 371 attacks within the 
four months, "only" one military from the Defense Forces of Israel was killed and 
another wounded, and four police officers suffered minor injuries. 
   
Conclusion 
Within the scope of more offensive counter terrorist strategies, other techniques could 
be mentioned as related to targeted killing, as is the case of "shoot to kill policing", 
generally more used by police forces in urban context69, or "extraordinary renditions"70
However, no counter terrorist strategy has proven complete efficiency in terms of 
response to terrorism. Even the use of most offensive models has been unsuccessful in 
the cancelling or predicting events such as those which occurred in Madrid, London or, 
more recently, in Oslo and Toulouse.  
 
which may be particularly useful in Intelligence because of the timely information they 
can provide on terrorist activity. 
                                                        
68 Israel Security Agency (2012), Monthly Summary – September 2012 Report, p. 2. Available at: 
www.shabak.gov.il. [Retrieved on October 10]. 
69 The most relevant example is that of Jean Charles de Menezes, shot in London on 22 July 2005, after the 
successful attacks on July 7 and the failed attacks on July 21, due to mistaken identity. The British police, 
believing he was a terrorist and due to his reluctance to abide to police request to stop - increasing police 
suspicion - shot and killed him (about 5 to 9 close range shots to the head).  
70  “extraordinary rendition occurs when American Authorities render an individual without the consent of the 
host country. (…) Renditions, extraordinary or otherwise, have advantages. First and foremost, rendition 
is one way of removing terror suspects from the streets. (…) The act of rendition may also disrupt 
terrorist plots in their planning phases, as individuals critical to the successful planning of a terrorist 
operation are incapacitated”. See Peritz, Rosenbach, 2012: 64. 
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A qualitative analysis (successful vs. unsuccessful attacks) of the independent cells' 
efficiency, for example in Europe, would allow us to conclude that these are less 
efficient than those which, though autonomous - as the Madrid and London cells - 
establish links with other terrorist structures. Diffuse and poorly organized structures, 
limited to one individual as in the case of individual (lone-wolf) terrorism, may present 
a serious obstacle to security forces and services monitoring and controlling their 
activities. 
The recent case of Mohammed Merah, French citizen of Algerian descent responsible for 
the murder of seven people in the French region of Toulouse, among which three 
Jewish children, evidences the threat of "spontaneous" or "trigger" terrorism.  
Only time will allow us to understand this individual's links to other terrorist groups or 
his frequently claimed role in an attempt by DCRI71 or DGSE72
Meanwhile, "The failure may be content; the victim may claim damages; and the loser 
may get ready for the next round. On the contrary, extreme losers hide away, become 
invisible, care for their ghosts, gather energy and wait for their turn. (…) they are, for 
once, masters of life and death” (Enzensberger, 2008: 10 and 17). 
 to infiltrate extremist 
groups.  We aim to further discuss this issue.  
This is, thus, an invisible, silent threat... which we are not ready for. This army of 
"extreme losers" are, even if just once and for one last moment, at the head of the 
game. 
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